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Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the Legal  
Character of the Global Commonwealth
ANDREAS WAGNER*
Abstract―In  discussing  the  works  of  16th-century  theorists  Francisco  de  Vitoria  and 
Alberico  Gentili,  this  article  examines  how  two  different  conceptions  of  a  global  legal 
community affect the legal character of the international order and the obligatory force of 
international law. For Vitoria the legal bindingness of ius gentium necessarily presupposes an 
integrated character of the global commonwealth that leads him to as it were ascribe legal 
personality to the global community as a whole. But then its legal status and its consequences  
have to be clarified. For Gentili on the other hand, sovereign states in their plurality are the 
pinnacle  of  the  legal  order(s).  His  model  of  a  globally  valid  ius  gentium then  oscillates 
between being analogous to private law, depending on individual acceptance by states and 
being natural law, appearing in a certain sense as a form rather of morality than of law.
Keywords―International law, legal history, legal philosophy, Alberico Gentili, Francisco 
de Vitoria, global legal community.
Undeniably, over the last decades, an international society has taken shape which corresponds 
largely to Vitoria’s conception of a universal society: … The attribution of autonomous law-
making power to international society, transcending the need for individual acceptance by its 
States,  but  based  on the consent  of  the larger  part  of  society,  is  reflected  in  the  general  
principles of international law recognized as sources of international law.1
Many current controversies in the theory of international law hinge on some notion of a universal 
legal community that can on its own sustain and possibly even generate legal obligations for its 
members. In fact, one of the major issues today is the quarrel between theories of legal pluralism 
and  those  of  legal  universalism,  with  the  latter  drawing  heavily  on  ideas  of  a  global  legal  
community, for example in grounding the public or even constitutional aspects of international law 
*Cluster  of  Excellence  ‘The  Formation  of  Normative  Orders’,  University  of  Frankfurt/Main,  Germany.  Email:  
Andreas.Wagner@em.uni-frankfurt.de. I owe great debt to my colleagues in the Cluster's research project on the School  
of Salamanca, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Kirstin Bunge, Matthias Schweighöfer and Anselm Spindler, who together  
constituted the better part of an almost ideal collaborative research environment. In 2009 we held a conference on ‘The 
Normativity of Law in the School of Salamanca’, from the participants of which I have received valuable feedback on  
some of the ideas presented here. I am grateful for further helpful comments and suggestions from Ben Kamis, Thomas  
Kleinlein, Andreas Niederberger and Benjamin Straumann. I also wish to thank the OJLS's anonymous reader, who has 
kindly offered points of critique that led me to re-think and clarify some of the arguments, which certainly has made this 
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1Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, ‘Address on the occasion of the presentation  
of  the  Francisco  de  Vitoria  medal  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice  by  the  city  of  Vitoria’ (5  April  2006) 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?p1=6&p2=1&pr=1002> accessed 18 January 2011.
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or in explaining the substantive character of certain fundamental legal values.2 In this essay, I argue 
that two different conceptions of the legal character of a global community can be discerned in two 
authors of early modern international law: Both Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) and Alberico 
Gentili  (1552–1608)  have  developed  ideas  of  how  a  global  community  of  mankind  makes 
international law apply globally, but they differ in the understanding of its normative character.3 
One of the central differences concerns the understanding of international law as a set of norms that  
are originating in human lawmaking and at the same time binding also those who did not assent to 
them.  In  systematic  terms,  the  contrast  between  the  two  authors  suggests  that  the  legal 
conceptualization of the global community lies at the point of bifurcation between a multilateral and 
a  public  understanding  of  international  law or,  to  name a  more  concrete  example,  between  a 
‘bi-/unilateral’ and a ‘punitive’ understanding of the legal consequences of internationally wrongful 
acts.4 Put in those terms, the suggested historical analysis may serve as an inspiration for present-
day discussions of international law, although this is not discussed here in any detail.5
1. Francisco de Vitoria
Central to Francisco de Vitoria's understanding of law in general is its relation to the community 
that it regulates. His  relectio on the civil power of 1528 puts forward an argument according to 
which political power (potestas civilis) and commonwealth (res publica) are constituted as relata, 
2Cf eg A von Bogdandy and S Dellavalle, ‘Universalism and Particularism as Paradigms of International Law’ (IILJ  
Working Paper 2008/3) < http://www.iilj.org/publications/2008-3Bogdandy-Dellavalle.asp> accessed 18 January 2011. 
For  other  contributions  to  the  universalist  argument  and its  reliance  on  ideas  of  a  global  legal  community,  cf  M  
Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschaftsrecht (Springer, Heidelberg 2010); R Domingo, The New Global Law (CUP, 
Cambridge 2010); A Paulus, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht (Beck, München 2001).
3For the purposes of this text, I assume that it is possible to use ‘international law’ in referring to the notion of ‘ius  
gentium’ and similar delicate translations. Whether or not these can be justified is out of scope for the present article  
(although I submit they can), hence they have to be taken with a grain of salt. Also, it should be mentioned that I am 
using the term ‘positive law’ not in the sense of ‘statutory law’, but of ‘not natural/necessary law’, so that it  also  
encompasses customary law, and that by ‘public law’ I am referring to the law of a civic condition that is created and  
susceptible to being enforced without or even against the will of the affected subjects.
4Cf A Blane and B Kingsbury, ‘Punishment and the ius post bellum’ in B Kingsbury and B Straumann (eds),  The 
Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (OUP, Oxford 2010) 241–265, 
and the non-historical debates in Paulus (n 2) 386–413 and Payandeh (n 2) 369–431. All of these refer to ILC, ‘Articles  
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its 53rd session’ (2001) UN Doc A/56/10.
5A similar reasoning may have motivated other contributions addressing historical ideas of humanity as a legal  
concept, like eg T Meron, ‘Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suárez’ (1991) 85 AJIL 110–116; C  
Focarelli,  ‘On the  concept  of  “International  Community  as  a  Whole” in  International  Law’ (2007)  14  Journal  of 
International Cooperation Studies 51–70.
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that is, they are inseparable and can be conceptualized only in relation to one another.6 Being the 
focal point of the common or public good, political power is the catalyst for the very existence of a  
commonwealth and the condition of its coherence over time. Vice versa, since there is no a priori 
localization of that political power, every actual instance of it must be proven in some way (eg by 
election) to correspond to the commonwealth itself first.7 Political power then has a factual and a 
normative aspect to it, it is a de facto power the public character of which has been acknowledged: 
‘Public power is the faculty, authority or right to govern the civil commonwealth.’8 Thus, potestas is 
not a sociological, but a legal concept; it is factual power reflexively embedded in a legal order. 
Correspondingly,  the exercise of political power,  the governance of the commonwealth consists 
precisely in operating the mechanics of the legal order:  to ‘frame laws, propose policies, judge 
disputes, punish transgressors’.9 Conversely,  the acknowledgement of the political power by the 
commonwealth is a legal act as well; it is a  constitutio translatione auctoritatis.10 In this sense, 
public  power  and  political  commonwealth  are  articulated  and jointly  constituted  only  in  legal 
practice.  This  conjunctural  nature of law,  political  power and commonwealth implies  a  distinct 
normative quality of their union, which cannot be reduced to an aggregation of the qualities of 
isolated elements, but which grounds their normative claims in the first place.
Based on the fundamental but abstract necessity of the connection between commonwealth and 
political power, the question of the specific institutional form of government is of a different nature 
6Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On Civil Power’ in idem, Political Writings (ed A Pagden and J Lawrance, CUP, Cambridge 
1991) 1–44. Throughout this essay, I cite this as CP. For all texts I supply the page number of the used editions in square 
brackets.  On the genres of  relectiones  and  lecturae and on the history of their  editions cf A Sarmiento, ‘Lecturas 
ineditas de F. De Vitoria. Bases para la edicion crítica’ (1980) 12 Scripta Theologica 575–592.
7In Vitoria's terms: the commonwealth ‘cannot exist’ without governing power (CP § 5 [9]) and at the same time it is 
the ‘material cause’ of this power (CP § 7 [11]). For a discussion of this mutual dependency, cf A Niederberger, ‘Recht 
als Grund der  res publica und  res publica als Grund des Rechts’ in K Bunge, A Spindler and A Wagner (eds)  Die 
Normativität des Rechts bei Francisco de Vitoria (Frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart 2011, forthcoming).
8CP § 10 [18], transl. modified. There is some difficulty in translating this potestas: Vitoria never actually speaks of 
‘potestas politica’ and although using ‘civil power’ might have emphasized the institutional framework with which  
Vitoria's  ‘potestas  civilis’ is  necessarily  connected,  here  I  prefer  ‘political’ power  for  reasons  of  common usage.  
Compare M Barbier, ‘La notion de res publica chez Vitoria’ in YC Zarka (ed), Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la  
philosophie politique moderne (PUF, Paris 1999) 83–101, here 87 fn 1.
9CP § 8 [14]. At various places, Vitoria calls this ‘administratio’ or ‘gubernatio’. At other places, he uses ‘tutela’, but  
always in self-reflexive verb form, as in ‘potestas tuendi se’, or, yet another term, ‘potestas dirigendi se’. In sum, he is  
not overly concerned in fixing this class of actions terminologically. Yet with legislation, administration, jurisdiction 
and punishment he obviously has very specific actions in mind.
10CP § 8 [16f], 12 [21].
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and  up  to  the  commonwealth  itself  to  decide  autonomously.11 The  normative  dignity  of  the 
particular government then – be that prince, senate or some other group of persons – has two roots: 
One is  the  set  of  competences  resulting  from its  legislative  and  executive  position  within  the 
societal  order  of  rules  and  laws,  the  other  is  a  normative  correspondence  between  it  and  the 
commonwealth's self-determination. Since the latter motive is not merely a question of either/or, but 
a substantial response to the features of the government, it is not only a justification of it, but also a 
specification and in a sense even a limitation.12 The distinction between the two motives is rendered 
by Vitoria in distinguishing ‘potestas’ and ‘auctoritas’ in his discussion of royal power:
Royal  power  (regia  potestas)  clearly  comes  immediately  from God himself,  even though 
kings are created by the commonwealth. That is to say, the commonwealth does not transfer to 
the sovereign his power (potestas), but his own authority (propria auctoritas);  there is no 
question  of  two  separate  powers,  one  belonging  to  the  sovereign  and  the  other  to  the 
community.13
This foundation of political power has very concrete consequences. First, it provides the foundation 
of the principle of majority rule. For given such a collective entity capable of action, why should a 
minority have the power to decide that nothing is  to be done by the collective rather than the 
majority have the power to decide that something be done by it?
When there are two dissenting parties in the administration of the commonwealth, if each 
holds contradictory opinions, one of the two must necessarily prevail;  but in this case the 
opinion of the minority should clearly not prevail, and therefore the opinion of the majority 
must be followed. … Should any greater consensus be required for a positive action than for a 
negative one?14
Second,  and  more  important  for  the  present  purpose,  the  distinction  between  ‘auctoritas’ and 
‘potestas’ explicates that the obligatory force of laws thus has two normative aspects – first, they are 
not so much particular commands as norms that are part of a factual system of normative social 
11CP § 14 [32].
12Cf also Vitoria, ‘On Law: Lectures on ST I-II. 90-105’ in idem, Political Writings (n 6) 153–204, here q 105, art 2 
[200–204]. In this sense he can also say that a prince always holds his office by election as in Vitoria, ‘On the Law of  
War’ in idem, Political Writings (n 6) 293–327, here q 1, art 2, § 6 [301]. Similarly, this constellation can explain why at 
several places Vitoria holds that ‘whatever laws the commonwealth can pass, … the king can pass the same’ and yet at  
the same time insist that ‘the king cannot do everything that the commonwealth can’ (Vitoria, ‘On Law’ q 105, art 2  
[201f]).
13CP § 8 [16f], transl. modified. Note however, that in § 14 [31] Vitoria explains royal power as being formed when 
the commonwealth gives power (dat potestatem) over the citizens to a single man. My interpretation of the relation 
auctoritas/potestas draws heavily on A Miaja de la Muela, ‘El derecho “totius orbis” en el pensamiento de Francisco de 
Vitoria’ (1965) 18 Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 341–364, esp. 352–362. Cf also A Pagden ‘Introduction’ 
in Vitoria, Political Writings (n 6) xiii–xxviii, here esp xix – xxi.
14CP § 14 [30].
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coordination  which  imparts  its  benefits  on  obedience  to  them (potestas),  and second,  they  are 
related to the practical reason and political experience of the commonwealth as a collective actor  
(auctoritas).  The  latter  moment  makes  the  normative  validity  of  laws  to  a  certain  extent 
independent of the institution that  de facto creates them (that is, independent of the  potestas of a 
legislative institution). This can explain how, notwithstanding his superiority to the citizens supra 
omnes simul, the king is bound by his own laws: The vis legis of the laws originates not only in the 
legislative competence of the prince, it is not imparted on them only in their actual making. (Neither 
is it due to their being authorized by God.) But they may, and normally do enjoy mediate or maybe 
even sometimes immediate authorization by the commonwealth itself.15
[L]aws passed  by a king have the same force (vis)  as if  they  were  passed by  the whole  
commonwealth, as explained above. But laws passed by the commonwealth bind everyone – 
hence they bind the king, even if he himself passed them.16
In a famous passage in the same article, Vitoria extends this argument to the norms of ius gentium 
and emphasizes how their  vis legis, in contrast to the lesser obligatory force of mere  pacta and 
condictiones, is connected to the public power of a commonwealth:
[T]he law of nations does not have the force merely of pacts or agreements between men, but 
has  the  force  of  law  (vis  legis).  The  whole  world  (totus  orbis),  which  is  in  a  sense  a 
commonwealth,  has  the  power  to  enact  laws  (potestas  ferendi  leges)  which  are  just  and 
convenient to all men; norms like these make up the law of nations. … No kingdom may 
choose to ignore the law of nations, because it is given by the authority of the whole world 
(est latum totius orbis auctoritate).17
As  Adolfo  Miaja  de  la  Muela  has  shown,  Vitoria  seems  to  suggest  that,  while  the  global 
commonwealth de iure has potestas ferendi leges, there is no concrete institution that could enact 
this  de facto and thus there is no statutory law – lex – at this level. However, there are unwritten 
norms  –  ius  –,  and  whatever  their  origin  is,  they  gain  normative  validity  via  the  global 
commonwealth's auctoritas.18 In this manner, their obligatory force on the one hand corresponds to 
15Ibid.
16Ibid § 21 [40], transl. modified and emphasis added. The use of the ‘as if’ (ac si ferrentur) indicates that, on 
Vitoria’s account, the obligatory force of legal norms does not depend on their de facto creation, but on an authorization 
by the commonwealth that could even be a legal fiction – the crucial criterion being whether they are equitable and  
convenient for the commonwealth. See also Vitoria's account of in what sense and under which conditions even the  
laws of a tyrant are binding, ibid § 23 [42] and in Vitoria, Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomas, vol III:  
De iustitia (ed V Beltrán de Heredía, Apartado, Salamanca 1934) q 60 art 6 [54]. Note how the acknowledgement of  
equity and convenience is not a matter to be judged by the natural reason of individual persons qua singuli but (in some 
way that is in need of explanation) a matter of collective reasoning. Also, note how Vitoria in this whole discussion does 
not pursue Thomas Aquinas’ argument of a difference between vis coactiva and vis directiva.
17Ibid art 21 [40], transl. modified.
18Cf A Miaja de la Muela (n 13).
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the universal and public character of the global commonwealth, and on the other hand it is perfectly  
consistent with them not being necessary or natural law.19
And  for  Vitoria,  there  is  no  question  whether  such  a  commonwealth  exists  on  a  global, 
“international” level. In addition to the just mentioned statement about the ‘whole world which is in 
a  sense  a  commonwealth’,  the  very  first  of  the  ‘legitimate  titles’,  eventually  justifying  an 
intervention of the Spanish in the New World in his  Relectio de Indis  of 1539,20 is  the title of 
‘natural partnership and communication.’21 From this follow rights of, among others, travel and 
commerce, and from it also follows a right to tell the truth (preach the gospel). 22 Although on first 
view the “naturality” of the ‘natural partnership’ seems unequivocal with regards to the status of the 
global community itself, on second thought it has a peculiar status: The mentioned article uses the 
formulation in giving a name to a legal title, but looking at the title's justification, the community in 
question is  relied upon neither  as a fact nor as a normative demand. Rather,  it  is  presented as 
normative idea necessarily presupposed by all kinds of rights, demands and contracts, such as the 
contract in which the original division of property and jurisdictions has been decided.
This  point  [that  is,  that  no  divine  law  has  constituted  a  global  empire]  can  be  easily 
understood by anyone who examines the method of succession by which the empires and 
dominions of the world have been handed down to our day. … [I]t is clear that after Noah the 
world was divided into various countries and kingdoms. This was either ordered by Noah 
himself, … or, as seems more likely, [was done] by mutual consent of the nations (consensu 
mutuo gentium), as various families colonized different countries.23
This picture of a presumed consensus leading to the establishment of different realms is not so 
much a historical assertion about the genealogy of nations and the historical priority of some global  
community, it is rather a sort of  praesumtio iuris. It serves first of all to explain and justify the 
present landscape of legal entities, but also as a resource to assess further legal questions.24 One of 
the main points it conveys is this: Since by natural law humankind was in common possession of  
the earth, if the foundation of the many particular commonwealths is to be legally effective, it has to 
19Both aspects are also emphasized by Miaja de la Muela, ibid 348–352.
20Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’ in idem, Political Writings (n 6) 231–292, henceforth cited as OAI.
21Ibid primus titulus legit., q 3, art 1, § 1 [278]: ‘First just title, of natural partnership and communication.’
22For the relation between secular and theological aspects of Vitoria's discussion, and for further explication of the  
presently  suggested,  admittedly  rather  secular  reading of  Vitoria,  cf  A Spindler,  ‘Vernunft,  Gesetz  und Recht  bei 
Francisco de Vitoria’ in Bunge/Spindler/Wagner (eds), Normativität des Rechts (n 7) and A Wagner, ‘Die Theologie, die 
Politik  und das  internationale  Recht.  Vitorias  Sprecher-  und Akteursrollen’ in  N  Brieskorn  and  G Stiening (eds), 
Francisco de Vitorias De Indis in interdisziplinärer Perspektive (Frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart 2011, forthcoming).
23Ibid primus titulus illegit., q 2, art 1, § 25 [255].
24Eg in an assessment of the possibility of some prohibition on free travel, OAI, primus titulus legit., q 3, art 1, § 2  
[278].
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be understood as being a result of positive lawmaking by the global commonwealth.
The claims of a particular political entity, gens or natio, that has been constituted as bearer of 
claims in the original divisio rerum are then conditioned by encompassing communities that have 
either been constituted supervening upon the one in question (as Christianity has been) or that have 
to be presupposed (as the global commonwealth has to be). Hence a war that would be objectively 
justified if one took into account a particular commonwealth in its relation to another particular 
commonwealth might become unjust and illegal by its consequences for the wider commonwealth:
Since any commonwealth is part of the world as a whole (pars totius orbis),  … I should 
regard any war which is useful to one commonwealth or kingdom but of proven harm to the 
world … as, by that very token, unjust.25
But not only does this concept put limits on the external actions of particular commonwealths, it  
also provides a justification for active intervention into them: In the second relectio on the question 
of the Indians, usually called Relectio de iure belli, Vitoria argues that if it is necessary for the finis  
et bonum totius orbis, the right of a particular commonwealth not to be interfered with is superseded 
or trumped by the public interest in prosecution and law enforcement.
A seventh proof [for the permissibility of war, AW] is based on the purpose and good of the 
whole world. Surely it would be impossible for the world to be happy …, if tyrants … were 
able to injure and oppress the good and the innocent without punishment ….26
Whereas the divisio rerum, as an act of public policy has established “private” realms for each of 
the particular communities, they all have to remain within the constitutive parameters of the global 
commonwealth.  The freedoms private actors have in their  affairs are protected,  determined and 
limited by a public framework, the authority of which is different from the titles any private actor 
might have. Matters of self-government are one thing, and they do have an external aspect in terms 
of self-defence and enforcement of restitution, but the very existence of the global legal order is 
quite another thing, and it is this which implies public authority and power to punish – ‘otherwise 
the world could not exist’.27
It  is  important  not  to  confuse  the  insistence  on  public  authority  with  a  denial  of  private 
autonomy and of subjective rights: Vitoria's conception is not one of “objective right”, “organicism” 
or “holism” where in every case the more encompassing and more dignified community would be 
determining the role and value of every subordinate subject and its rights. Individual right-bearers 
in the sense of natural persons just do not need to be authorized and institutionalized in the same 
25CP § 13 [21].
26Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ (n 12) q 1, art 1 [298]. Note that the concept is indifferent as to whether the ‘good  
and the innocent’ are the tyrant's own subjects or not.
27Ibid q 1, art 4, § 5 [305], transl. modified.
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way as political institutions.28 The protection of their (fundamental) rights is the ground for the 
global commonwealth, and these rights are not at the disposal of any political potestas or auctoritas, 
however universal these may be.29
Let that be sufficient to show how Vitoria imagines the foundation of central aspects of the 
obligatory  force of  ius  gentium.  He has  managed so far  to  discuss  this  with  surprisingly  little 
attention to how this law is created de facto – and he has hinted at why this may in fact not matter 
much. But even granted that the factual sources of law maybe need not justify the law's normative 
claim, it is advisable to reflect briefly on their relation to the source of this normative claim, as 
outlined above, especially given that on the global level there is  de facto no constituted global 
potestas and that hence it is unclear where the norms that are susceptible to being authorized by the 
global commonwealth are coming from in the first place.30
Now, while Vitoria emphasizes that the norms of ius gentium possess vis legis, as far as I am 
aware he never uses the term  leges for them. With the freedoms of travel, commerce and truth-
telling,  delimitations  of  particular  jurisdictions,  prohibition  on  the  externalization  of  costs  of 
domestic self-government etc, he has very concrete (and far-reaching) rules in mind,31 but as  ius 
gentium they are surely not statutory law. In his commentary on Thomas Aquinas's treatise on law, 
one can see how he prefers to treat statutory norms of civil (or canon) law as paradigmatic cases of 
leges, and there he does not even mention the ius gentium. However, in this text he explains how 
28In ‘On the American Indians’, Vitoria submits that every human being is endowed with legal personality. Cf OAI q  
1 [239–251].
29This can be seen from Vitoria's discussion of tyranny in OAI quintus titulus legit., q 3, art 5 [287f]; Vitoria, ‘On  
Dietary Laws, or Self-Restraint’ in idem, Political Writings (n 6) 207–230, here q 1, art 5 [225f]; Vitoria, ‘On Law’ (n 
12) q 105, art 2, prop 13 [204]; and Vitoria, De iustitia (n 16) q 64, art 6 [298–302]. Cf also A Wagner, ‘Zum Verhältnis 
von Völkerrecht und Rechtsbegriff bei Francisco de Vitoria’ in Bunge/Spindler/Wagner (eds), Normativität des Rechts 
(n 7).
30It may be worthwhile to note that in spite of all similarities, Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), a close collaborator of  
Vitoria  focuses  much more  on the  actual  exercise  of  governmental,  above all  legislative  functions – and ends up 
denying the plausibility of the idea of a global commonwealth. Cf eg Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure libri decem,  
vol II (ed V Diego Carro, Instituto de Estudios Polit́icos, Madrid 1968) lib IV, q 4 a 2 [304]; on the contrast between 
Soto and Vitoria, cf also R Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace (OUP, Oxford 1999) 73–75 and A Wagner, ‘Domingo de 
Soto über die communitas totius orbis’ in K Bunge, S Schweighöfer, A Spindler and A Wagner (eds),  Recht zwischen 
Philosophie,  Theologie  und  Jurisprudenz:  Beiträge  zur  Begriffsgeschichte  zwischen  Francisco  de  Vitoria  und  
Francisco Suárez (Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 2011, in preparation).
31The mentioned freedoms are developed in the first two legitimate titles in OAI q 3, art 1f [278–286]. With regards  
to the delimitations of jurisdictions, Vitoria holds that ‘for the most part these matters are done according to the law of 
nations or human law’ (Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ (n 12) q 1, art 2 § 9 [302]). As can be learned from ‘On the Law of  
War’ (ibid q 1, art 4, §§ 13f [303f], if burdens illegitimately imposed on others qualify as (very) serious iniuria, they 
may justify recourse to such extreme measures as war.
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one other type of norms that are not leges can acquire vis legis: customs.32 Prima facie customs do 
not possess that force, but can acquire it when they can be interpreted as ‘signs’ for a corresponding 
intention of the legislator.33 Yet the pure facticity of a social or princely custom is not a sufficient 
ground for such an interpretation; it has to be supplemented by either the verdict of sapientes or by 
customary authoritative  punishment  of  transgressors.  In  the  case of  ius  gentium then,  where  a 
legislating  institution  is  lacking,  the  legislator  whose  intention  is  to  be  inferred  is  the  global 
commonwealth as a whole (whose existence must be presupposed for reasons described above). 
With regards to the multi-level legal environment of the res publica totius orbis, Vitoria can connect 
this  argument  with  the  majority  principle  to  take  convergent  municipal  laws,  which  imply 
punishment of transgressors and explicit adoption by multiple particular commonwealths, as signs 
for  the  intention  of  the  global  legal  community.  The  normative  authority  of  particular 
commonwealths – or even of their governments – on the municipal level is transformed into an 
epistemic authority on the international level and cannot decide on, but effectively contribute to, the 
recognition of rules of ius gentium.
[I]f the law of nations is derived in a sufficient way from natural law, it is manifestly able to  
create binding rights. But given that it is not always derived from natural law, it seems to 
result from the consent of the greater part of the world, especially when it is for the common 
good of all men. If, after the dawn of creation or after the refashioning of the world following 
the Flood, the majority of men decided that the safety of ambassadors should everywhere be 
inviolable …, then that certainly has binding force, even if some disagree.34
As a last point, I want to briefly emphasize once again the ‘positive law’-character of Vitoria's ius 
gentium: His presentation of its norms – be that the immunity of legates, the original divisio rerum 
or the qualification of some ‘imperfect’ commonwealths as nonetheless competent to wage war 35 – 
usually  conveys  that  those  norms are  products  of  human  practical  reason  that  could,  logically 
speaking,  have  turned  out  differently.  The  merely  epistemic  role  that  particular  authorities 
sometimes assume does not imply that these norms are in some way naturally given or without 
alternative. In the previously quoted passage, the consent of the majority is necessary and sufficient 
precisely in cases where no derivation from necessary principles (that is, natural law) is possible. 
32Vitoria, ‘On Law’ (n 12) q 97 art 3 [185f].
33Vitoria uses the concept of auctoritas in his first proposition again: ‘no custom can be binding … except by the 
express authority of the superior power (ex intentione et auctoritate superioris)’ (ibid [185]), but in the remainder of the 
article he speaks rather of intentio and voluntas. The role of the sapientes hints at the rational accessibility of authority 
again, however.
34OAI primus titulus legit., q 3, art 1, § 4 [281], transl. modified. As we have seen, the consent of the majority can be  
sufficient to  create  public obligations (also for  those who did not  partake in  the consensus)  only given the wider  
framework of a republican commonwealth.
35Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ (n 12) q 1, art 2, § 9 [302].
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This  is  also confirmed when Vitoria  describes  the task of legislation  in  toto  as one more of  a 
probabilistic than of a determinate nature:
Many of those things – also of those that a prince suitably commands – cannot be accounted 
for with self-evidential reasons, but only with probable ones.36
2. Alberico Gentili
The  Italian  protestant  and  Regius  Professor  of  Civil  Law  at  Oxford  Alberico  Gentili  is  also 
frequently counted among the founders of modern international law, especially insofar as, taking up 
ideas of Bodin's theory of sovereignty, he suggested an even more independent role of the states in 
international law.37 Far from presenting an outright positivist  theory of international law, in  his 
arguably most important text De iure belli libri tres (1598) he starts out from a classical definition 
of ius gentium which focuses on naturalis ratio. Joining to it an idea of successive acceptance by all 
men, he develops a model of international law which is at first glance not unlike Vitoria's:
[The founders and authors of our laws] say that the law of nations is that which is in use 
among all the nations (gentes) of men, which native reason has established among all human 
beings and which is equally observed by all mankind. Such a law is natural law. … But that  
which has successively seemed acceptable to all men should be regarded as representing the 
intention and purpose of the entire world (totius orbis decretum fuisse existimetur).38
The combination of natural reason and historical acceptance hints at a complicated tension. In fact,  
36Vitoria, ‘On Dietary Laws, or Self-Restraint’ (n 29) q 1, art 5 [220], transl. modified.
37For David Kennedy, his reversal  of  the asymmetry of  power between the  sovereigns and the global order  in 
comparison to the ‘Spanish scholastics’ marked ‘the beginning of the end of primitive scholarship’; cf D Kennedy, 
‘Primitive  Legal  Scholarship’ (1986)  27  HILJ  1–98,  here  58f.  Cf  also  JL Holzgrefe,  ‘The  Origins  of  Modern 
International Relations Theory’ (1989) 15 Review of International Studies 11–26. Regarding the contrast to Vitoria, cf D 
Panizza, ‘Political Theory and Jurisprudence in Gentili's  De iure belli. The great debate between “theological” and 
“humanist” perspectives from Vitoria to Grotius’ (IILJ Working Paper 2005/15) <http://www.iilj.org/publications/2005-
15Panizza.asp>  accessed  18  January  2011;  and  with  regards  to  Gentili's  enduring  importance  cf  B  Kingsbury,  
‘Confronting Difference:  The Puzzling Durability  of  Gentili's  Combination of  Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative  
Judgment’ (1998) 92 AJIL 713–723. The classical attribution of parenthood of modern international law to Gentili is 
Thomas E. Holland's ‘Inaugural Lecture’ from 1874, in TE Holland, Studies in International Law (Clarendon, Oxford 
1898)  1–23.  See  also  P Haggenmacher,  ‘Grotius  and  Gentili:  A Reassessment  of  Thomas  E.  Holland's  Inaugural  
Lecture’ in H Bull, B Kingsbury and A Roberts (eds),  Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Clarendon, Oxford 
1992) 133–180.
38Alberico Gentili,  De iure belli libri tres, vol 2 (ed. J Brown Scott, Clarendon, Oxford 1933) lib I, ch I [8]. For 
further arguments contrasting Gentili's ideas of ‘totus orbis’ with those of the Spaniards, cf the texts referenced above (n  
5)  and  most  recently  A  Pagden,  ‘Gentili,  Vitoria  and  the  Fabrication  of  a  “Natural  Law  of  Nations”’  in 
Kingsbury/Straumann (eds), Roman Foundations (n 4) 340–361.
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we can identify motives both of natural law and of an empirical, positive law in Gentili's concept of  
international law.39 In what follows I want to pursue these further and argue that neither motive 
covers a quasi-republican public international legal order of a kind comparable to the one described 
above, and that instead both motives end up with a bi- or multilateral concept of obligation that 
cannot de jure overcome the objection of a sovereign state which does not want to be obliged.
The argument of  successive acceptance at  the end of the quoted passage is  located in  the 
context of the question of in what sense ‘all human beings’ (from the preceding definition) is to be  
understood. Before saying anything about natural law, Gentili  explains that when one does not 
understand ‘all’ in an absolute sense, one has a large enough set of peoples providing empirical 
evidence on the basis of which reliably to compile the laws of the nations. Thus, taking up again the 
argument of successive acceptance, he argues that one should find out what rules the majority of  
humans de facto customarily observe.
[A]s the rule of a state and the making of its laws are in the hands of a majority of its citizens,  
just so is the rule of the world in the hands of the aggregation of the greater part of the world. 
Moreover, this is especially true of the unwritten law; for a custom is binding upon all the 
members of a state and is called the custom of the entire state, even if every citizen has not 
agreed to it, but haply some have even opposed it.40
Having thus shifted the focus to unwritten laws and custom, Gentili presents us with an argument 
which he considers more adequate, but which amounts to saying that these customs cannot have 
been made by men:
But there is another more elegant definition of the law of nations …, that there are everywhere 
certain unwritten laws, not enacted by men …, but given to them by God. … Such laws are 
not written, but inborn; we have not learned, received, and read them, but we have wrested, 
drawn, and forced them out of nature herself. We have not received them through instruction, 
but have acquired them at birth; we have gained them, not by training, but by instinct.41
For  Gentili,  natural  law is  the  foundation  of  international  law,  or  both  are  even  identical.  He 
adduces natural reasons' self-evidential character, the examples of philosophers and wise men who 
usually speak and act according to nature,42 and arguments and reasons of his own as material for 
formulating the laws of nations. Thus, rather than explaining how the majority of mankind could be 
imagined  as  and  justified  in  legislating  for  the  whole,  he  offers  as  the  main  resource  for 
international  law's  binding force  (‘ita  ius  defenditur  gentium’)  the moral  nature of  man which 
39Cf J Waldron, ‘Ius Gentium: A Defence of Gentili's Equation of the Law of Nations and the Law of Nature’ in 
Kingsbury/Straumann (eds), Roman Foundations (n 4) 283–296.
40Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib I, ch I [9].
41Ibid [9f]
42Ibid [10f].
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provides for an inexplicable sentiment that transgression cannot be justified.43 In this manner, the 
majority no longer legislates but rather exemplifies and reveals the nature present in every human 
being.44
Neither when speaking of natural law and natural reason, nor when relying on factual customs 
of  the  diverse peoples  does  Gentili  understand the norms of  ius  gentium as  deriving from the 
intentions  of  any  global  lawgiving  community.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  even  when  discussing 
customs, he is presenting them as developments of (reasonable) human nature. Hence there is not 
even a need to identify some  opinio iuris,  to  infer  a  legislative intention  from factual  custom, 
because  the  latter  is  already  binding  with  “natural  authority”.  In  other  words,  the  norms  of 
international law to which the nations are subject are not thought of as positive law. As we are going 
to see, insofar as positive international law would imply a (virtual) lawgiver and/or judge to which 
they would have to submit, it would even contradict Gentili's conception of a sovereign nation.
But after all Gentili does have a concept of the global commonwealth, does he not? If so, then  
what is it, if it is not a lawgiving community? As was the case with Vitoria, it appears prominently 
in the discussion of war for the purpose of helping others (Gentili: bellum honestum). But note how 
Gentili  is  presenting descriptions  of  the community  that  combine ethical  and legal  vocabulary,  
speaking of amor and benevolentia on the one hand and of civitas and res publica on the other:
[Defence for honour's sake] rests upon the fundamental principle, that nature has established 
among men kinship, love, kindliness, and a bond of fellowship (as Marcus Tullius says); and 
that the law of nations is based upon this association of the human race. It is precisely for that  
reason that the law of nations is called by Cicero ‘civil’. In fact, the Stoics maintained that the 
whole world formed one state (civitatem totius mundi unam esse) … Now you have heard that 
the whole world is one body, that all men are members of that body, that the world is their 
home and that it forms a state. Listen to these words once more, for they are beautiful. … 
Lactantius calls the world a commonwealth (res publica). It is a great state, having the form of 
43‘These things are so well known, that if you should try to prove them, you would render them obscure. … It has  
been made sufficiently clear that natural law does exist, and that if you should transgress it in any particular, you would 
desire to conceal the act through very shame. Or if you should go so far in shamelessness as to confess and try to justify 
the action, you would have the same feeling that one has towards those statements which are called axioms, namely, 
you would instinctively feel that the act could not be justified.’ (Ibid [10]).
44If we turn to his justification of the law of embassies, which in our discussion of Vitoria was reflecting the positive 
character of ius gentium, we see how Gentili again gives it a more natural character. For after the nations and realms  
had been separated and law had been established, ‘those having contiguous territory began to form friendly compacts,  
and to  refrain  from doing  injury  or  violence  to  one  another.  … But  since  it  was inevitable  that  obligations  and  
negotiations  should  arise  between  organizations  having  such  reciprocity  of  rights  as  exists  between  nations, 
commonwealths and kings,  and since those organizations are either unwilling or,  as often happens, unable to meet  
(certainly states cannot meet), it was absolutely necessary … that others should be appointed, who by representing the 
organizations would be able to transact the necessary business.’ (Alberico Gentili, De legationibus libri tres, vol II (ed J 
Brown Scott, OUP, New York 1924) lib I, ch XX [51], emphasis added).
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one commonwealth and one code of laws, says Philo. The one commonwealth of all, and the 
common city of all, say Tertullian and Minucius.45
However, Gentili seems to think that this has not quite resolved the question, given that a bit later,  
he is asking again: ‘Quid vero ista societas et coniunctio?’ And again he answers with citations, 
only this  time the  “legal-political” vocabulary no longer  appears  at  all,  and the citations focus 
exclusively on benevolentia and caritas as a kind of social instinct implanted in human nature.46 If 
the global commonwealth then is rather an ethical concept, an ideal  telos of our human nature, it 
certainly cannot in fact establish concrete norms of ius gentium that are unconditionally binding in 
the context of interactions between sovereign heads of states. The claim of their behaviour being 
legally regulated is founded on an analogy of rationes instead of on the legal authority of a global 
commonwealth:
Now what Plato and those expounders of the law say of private citizens we feel justified in 
applying to sovereigns and nations, since the rule [ratio] which governs a private citizen in his 
own state ought to govern a public citizen, that is to say a sovereign or a sovereign people, in  
this public and universal state formed by the world. As a private citizen conducts himself with 
reference to another private citizen, so ought it to be between one sovereign and another.47
The princes (ought to) stand in relation to one another just as private persons do in the municipal  
realm. They have a certain repertoire of legal instruments at their disposal which they can put to the 
service of their own particular interests. But the crucial difference is that municipal private law is 
backed by public authority – of the particular community as a whole and of the sovereign who 
governs it. This authority transcends the particular authority or legal power of the individual private 
actors. And a similar authority is lacking with regards to the relations between sovereigns.
Thus there is no possibility of an agent acting publicly in the sense of acting on behalf of the 
global commonwealth: When discussing the question of whether cross-border acts of individuals 
should count as private or public acts, Gentili holds that there are empirical criteria for identifying 
the publicness of an act or agent. For even the behaviour of the relevant community as a whole need 
not necessarily be regarded as its public action. What counts is a formalized deliberation of an 
45Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib I, ch XV [67].
46Commenting the same passages, D Panizza, ‘The “Freedom of the Sea” and the “Modern Cosmopolis” in Alberico  
Gentili's  De iure  belli’ (2009)  30 Grotiana  88–106,  emphasizes  the  ‘pivotal  role’ that  the  concept of  a  society of 
mankind played for Gentili, justifying offensive wars in support of ‘humanity’ and ‘liberty’ and also against violations  
of ‘the common law of humanity’, of ‘wrongs done to mankind’. But he goes on: ‘For Gentili, both kinds of war were  
instances of a distinctive common moral category, namely as wars undertaken for the sake of “honesty” as opposed to 
wars undertaken for the sake of “utility”, or of self-preservation.’ (Ibid 94, emphasis added.) Of course moral arguments  
like these can be used in justifying military enterprises, but can they function as legal titles?
47Gentili,  De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib I, ch XV [68]. It should be noted that this passage does not imply the 
inclusion of private individuals as subjects of ius gentium. Cf also below, note 57.
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assembly which has been convened in a specific,  customarily defined manner.  It  is  this  purely  
factual institutional framework that provides for the possibility of legally ascribing to individuals a  
public role.
‘When [is] an act … public and when [is it] private’. Undoubtedly a wrong is greater which is  
committed by several men; but yet it is not therefore a public one. Accordingly, our legal 
experts state correctly and explicitly that an act is a public one when the state has deliberated 
upon it in legitimate assembly; and therefore that action is not public which has been taken by 
a magistrate or even by the entire populace in a different way as the result of some hasty  
resolutions.  … With reference to  a  legitimate assembly,  they say that  it  must  be brought 
together by the sound of a trumpet or bell, or in some other customary fashion. And when the 
whole state has not been convened, that the deliberations ought still to be directed towards a 
common action, and that it is not enough to sally forth with the state's equipment and ensigns 
of war.48
Needless to say, in the international realm, such assemblies are absent. Consequently, there is no 
way of constituting norms or actors of a “globally” public character. The quoted criteria that serve 
to  determine  the  public  character  of  acts  or  actors  allow  them  to  be  recognized  as  officially 
representing their  particular commonwealth,  but,  given the context of the argument,  this means 
merely establishing them as subjects of international law in the first place, not stating that they can 
be identified as internationally public acts or as actors stepping in for the order of international law 
as a whole. The actors have to qualify for publicness domestically in order to count  at all in the 
international realm, so to speak;49 but there they still count as merely private actors. And while there 
may be norms that are in a certain way binding on sovereigns in the international realm, they have 
no public authority  backing them. There just  cannot be such an authority,  since for conceptual 
reasons there can be no legal authority “above” a sovereign head of state. As far as the rules that  
regulate the “exterior” behaviour of princes are concerned, there can be no public administration of 
justice; there can be neither judge, nor legislator above the particular sovereign princes.50 In a way it 
does not even make any sense then to speak of laws that bind them:
[T]here cannot be judicial processes between supreme sovereigns (summos Principes) or free 
peoples  unless they themselves consent,  since they acknowledge no judge or superior.  … 
48Ibid ch XXI [103].
49In a fascinating twist, Gentili applies this argument in justifying interventions that defend mistreated subjects of a  
tyrannical regime: How can the suffered injuries be made to weigh when a sovereign's subjects have no legal status in 
international law? Gentili maintains that the subjects first have to be recognized as public actors in the domestic realm 
and suggests that when a sovereign makes war on his own subjects, he himself is producing the needed empirical  
evidence  for  the  subjects'  own  possession  of  (competing)  sovereign  power,  promoting  them to  a  position  in  the  
international realm where they can be legitimate allies and obtain assistance of other sovereigns – whether their cause 
was just in the first place or not. Cf ibid ch XVI [74–78].
50As Panizza, ‘Political Theory and Jurisprudence’ (n 37) 53 notes, the legal metaphor of ‘international law’ might  
boil down to the principle of sovereign equality.
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Therefore it was inevitable that the decision between sovereigns should be made by arms. 
‘War’, says Demosthenes, ‘is made against those who cannot be controlled by the laws, but 
judicial decisions are rendered in the case of private citizens’.51
Consequently, when it comes to assessing the legal quality of a sovereign's behaviour, only the 
sovereign him- or herself (or an arbiter authorized by the sovereign) can decide. For example, while 
natural law might limit the licit causes for war to, among others, fear of aggression, what exactly are 
sufficient  grounds  for  such fear  is  up  to  every  sovereign  to  decide  for  him-  or  herself. 52 The 
“natural” immediacy of the norms of  ius gentium that makes them apply to everyone all over the 
world at the same time obviates the need for an authority that could help to explain what it means  
that princes are legally bound by those norms, at least insofar as that would mean providing a way 
of  contesting,  adjudicating  or  sanctioning  the  infringement  of  those  norms.  The  international 
community is the generic community of mankind which can, by the factual overlap of some of its 
customs, help to  identify norms of natural law, but it is not a quasi-political community that can 
produce norms,  interpret and  adjudicate them or  authorize their  enforcement. Strictly speaking, 
there  can  be  no  inter-  or  even  supranational  legal  process  apart  from arbitration,  for  which  a 
consensus of the sovereign princes is required. Consequently war, even though it may be waged for 
objectively just reasons, is no longer thought of as being part of a quasi-legal process to re-establish  
justice.53
When one admits this relativization of the bindingness of legal imperatives on the sovereigns, 
the question of the legal character of the international order re-emerges and while legal vocabulary 
is used throughout all interactions, it is not clear how exactly this order would qualify as a legal  
order.54 At the very least Gentili's global legal order certainly cannot be understood as one of public 
51Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib I, ch III [15].
52Ibid ch XIV [61–63].
53Ibid ch VI [31–33]. It is possible to read this as an epistemic problem with a pragmatic solution: Objective justice 
might exist but cannot be known, therefore no judge can be in a position to adjudicate, and therefore a duel is  a  
pragmatic means of decision. Cf Panizza, ‘Political  Theory and Jurisprudence’ (n 37) 18–21. But what makes this  
epistemic problem different from the one in domestic conflicts, where law and legal proceedings do seem to be a fitting  
procedure?
54Maybe Gentili’s provisions defining what war is, what are its admissible causes, how it is to be declared, fought,  
and terminated are meant to serve as a sort of vocabulary offered to the parties so they can better understand each other  
and proceed in an orderly way. In this manner they would be binding as standards or language games are: one can only 
diverge from them at the cost of appearing meaningless to other actors. This does not mean to suggest that such costs  
are negligible – for eluding these procedures and classifications one might end up being barred from  ius gentium 
altogether or even be considered a ‘hostis omnium mortalium’, the measures against whom are no longer regulated by 
law; cf Gentili,  De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib I, ch IV [22f] and lib III, ch XXIII [423]. (On the lack of any legal  
protection for pirates, rebels etc see also below n 57.) I would maintain, however, that there is an important difference 
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law.55 It is hard to imagine strict norms resisting arbitrary interpretation by sovereign princes, but if 
there are any, they are not so much positive norms of that international order, but of natural law.56
For Gentili, the source of normative validity of international norms is natural reason revealing 
that  these norms are necessary,  not reasonably refutable.  Scriptural or historical authorities,  the 
‘great and good men’ and even the legal customs of peoples take on an epistemic role in helping to 
identify these norms. Here Gentili  is  not even very remote from Vitoria's  theory.  But even the 
intentions of the global commonwealth themselves are no more a source of normative validity than 
the insights of philosophers  – they are all  just  sources  of  cognizance of  those norms.  Gentili's 
insistence on the prevalence of state sovereignty moreover means that the global commonwealth 
neither disposes of instituted potestas (which is uncontroversial), nor possesses auctoritas: It simply 
is not a community capable of collective action and of practical rationality at all. Instead it seems to 
be the mere indication of the extension of natural morality, which is not only unconnected to legal  
auctoritas or potestas, but a category of an altogether different kind. The global community at the 
very least does not possess the legal authority that would be necessary to bring the norms of  ius 
gentium to bear against (sovereign) perpetrators on its own initiative or via an organ in a functional  
sense.57
between this type of “sanction” and the sanctions of a public legal order.
55This is further corroborated by his replacing the idea of justice as organizing principle with that of a balance of  
power; ibid ch XIV [64–66]. Cf Panizza, ‘Political Theory and Jurisprudence’ (n 37) 25; B Straumann, ‘The Corpus 
Iuris as a Source of Law Between Sovereigns in Alberico Gentili's Thought’ in Kingsbury/Straumann (eds),  Roman 
Foundations (n 4) 101–123.
56Cf eg Gentili's discussion of the Genoese spoiling the port of Savona in the 1520s, where he is oscillating between  
‘to me it seems unlawful to destroy harbours’ and ‘there may perhaps be other reasons which make it lawful to spoil  
harbours’; Gentili, De iure belli libri tres (n 38) lib III, ch XI [345f].
57The same applies to inalienable rights of individuals. For Gentili, no norm of ius gentium can provide a subject of a 
given potestas with a claim against this potestas or even just a stage on which to articulate such claims. Rebels do not 
enjoy  any status as subjects of  ius gentium;  rather,  like pirates and runaway slaves,  their  turning away from their 
authorities  strips  them of  any  legal  “relationability”:  ‘There  is  also another  reason why such men [ie  pirates  and 
brigands]  do  not  come under  the  law of  war;  namely,  because  that  law is  derived  from the  law of  nations,  and  
malefactors do not enjoy the privileges of a law to which they are foes’; ‘To raise the former questions [what can be or  
has usually been done with such men] is to argue on the basis of law, that is to say, the tie by which we are bound to our  
fellow men; but we are not bound to brigands by any such tie.’ Ibid lib I, ch IV [22f]. Compare this to the absolute  
impermissibility of putting any person outside of all law in Vitoria’s discussion of foreigners acquiring citizenship; OAI 
q 3, art 1, § 5 [281]. (See also on the absolute value of fundamental rights above, text to nn 28f.) It is as if for Vitoria,  
first of all, all human beings have been subjects of ius gentium and then as it were have constituted commonwealths and 
thus added to or eventually subtracted from their rights, but never so far as to fall out of the legal relation as such, while  
for Gentili, only commonwealths are subjects of  ius gentium and individual persons matter only insofar as they are 
“connected” to some commonwealth. For a brief hint at how this – at least as far as Vitoria is concerned – relates to 
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3. Conclusion
We have seen that both Francisco de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili in their elaboration of ius gentium 
can be understood as starting from the classical definition, which had defined it as constituted by 
natural reason in all of mankind. Classically, this had meant both its normative foundation and the  
source of its factual existence in the world. But what it means for a law to be legally binding had 
not been a very prominent question of the classical discussion, and here both authors offer their 
solutions.
But one approach leaves the definition untouched and adds the notion of political sovereignty. 
Then, according to the definition, all of mankind “knows” that everyone is bound by certain laws – 
the identification of which is realized by various epistemic functions that often themselves have a 
“transnational” dimension (history, philosophy, comparative legal analysis). These laws weigh in all 
social circumstances, be they a “state of nature” or the “civitas”, and thus they can claim adherence 
also  within  and  past  the  boundaries  of  sovereign  states.  The  instruments  of  adjudication  and 
enforcement,  however,  are  constituted  neither  by  the  reasonableness  nor  by  the  universal 
applicability  of  the  respective  norms,  but  by  the  rather  independent  notion  of  (domestically 
constituted) sovereignty. To the extent that the concept of sovereignty is linked to strong notions of 
factual legislation or unified administration/gubernatio, there are of course serious doubts about the 
conceptual  possibility  of  a  global  sovereign.  This  leads  to  the  situation  that,  because  of  its  
supposedly global recognition, law may serve as a medium of communication and of coordination 
in  the  interactions  between  sovereigns,  but  surely  not  in  the  way  of  public  norms  cogently 
regulating their behaviour. Internally, each sovereign and each commonwealth may describe his or 
its actions as being justified or bound by norms of  ius gentium  (and even be perfectly honest in 
doing so). But from the point of view of actors outside of that particular commonwealth, there is no 
reason to have any confidence in the regulating capacities of those norms, let alone any means to 
actively  control  or  enforce  them.  There  is  just  no  such  thing  as  supranational  legislation, 
adjudication or enforcement of norms and this is where the story ends. While there is supranational 
law  after  all,  it  is  one  of  natural  reason,  a  natural  law,  backed  and  recognized  by  a  moral 
community. The global legal order is not a commonwealth, built around law as a form of public  
practice and around a common good. It has no autonomous law-making power: In their normative 
foundation, its norms are analogous to natural law, given rather than positively made; but in their 
practice these norms are analogous to private law, depending on the private authority of consenting 
Hannah Arendt's discussion of a “right to have rights” cf Wagner, ‘Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Rechtsbegriff’ (n 29).
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subjects.58
The other approach gives the notion of reasonabless of laws a social or communal character 
and  the  laws  themselves  an  institutional  one.  Reasonableness  with  regards  to  laws  implies  an 
orientation towards a common good and thus a reference to a legal-political community as a whole, 
and reasonable laws imply the authority to coerce those who do not consent for the better of the 
whole  community.  And  this  authority  is  necessarily  connected  to  the  practical  reason  of  the 
community the community is not just the object, but must also be the subject of legislation. In this 
way, the ius gentium is connected in a very different way to the global community of mankind: The 
universal recognition of ius gentium no longer concerns only its cognizance or the extension of its 
use, but feeds back into its normative validity, and the communitas totius orbis is both the horizon 
and the source of  ius gentium. The idea that all human beings originally and ideally have been 
constituted as subjects  of  ius gentium does  not mean that they could not later  have decided to 
constitute a plurality of commonwealths,  such as those that presently figure as main entities in 
international law. But it means that the claims of particular commonwealths remain subordinate to 
the global legal community as a whole (and to some claims that individuals still can make). Unlike 
Gentili, Grotius and later Pufendorf, Vitoria insists that law enforcement, when it passes the crucial  
threshold  of  punishment,  requires  public,  not  merely  private  authority.  But  unlike  Hobbes,  he 
maintains that there is such an authority on the global level, that it is not self-contradictory and that 
it is necessarily presupposed by attempts to justify the present international landscape.59
For a republican international legal order, the “reason” of all human beings is not only a natural 
capacity, but, taking into account their social condition, can be thought to constitute an auctoritas in 
the legal sense. When the (presumed) reasonable intention of the global community is the more 
proximate normative foundation of ius gentium, then the problem of how to recognize when such an 
intention has formed still remains, and again various epistemic functions may be mobilized to that  
end. Similarly, the problem of identification and establishment of adequate institutional structures is  
not at all addressed. But once a legislating intention of the global community is identified, and once 
mechanisms of its assertion and enforcement are in place, we may draw on arguments presented in 
58Thus I am still not convinced that when according to this approach ‘the idea of the global respublica performs … 
[a] fundamental function [and] constitutes the foundation of the so-called “international community” and the primary  
source of legitimation of the ius gentium bellicum’ (Panizza, ‘Political Theory and Jurisprudence’ (n 37) 50), it has any 
legal effect.
59For a comparison of the models of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes, to which Gentili's and Vitoria's approaches  
remain to be contrasted, cf B Kingsbury and B Straumann, ‘State of Nature versus Commercial Sociability as the Basis  
of International Law. Reflections on the Roman Foundations and Current Interpretations of the International Political 
and  Legal  Thought  of  Grotius,  Hobbes,  and  Pufendorf’ in  S  Besson  and  J  Tasioulas  (eds),  The  Philosophy  of  
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2010) 33–52.
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these  portraits  of  Vitoria  and  Gentili  to  understand  the  normative  grounds  and  the  particular 
character of the authority that such norms and their enforcement can claim.
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